They could only come into being in the bureaucratic state with its rational laws …that is to say, where the judge’s behavior is on the whole ) capitalist society.
And, if so, doesn’t a rejection of all cultural manifestations of objectivity work counter to liberalism and progress?
If, as Honneth insists, the answer to both of these questions is yes, reification must be redefined if it is to retain its legitimacy and relevance.
Conversely, for Honneth, reification cannot be summed up as a strictly epistemic or scientific mistake: “This is not only because reification constitutes a multilayered and stable syndrome of distorted consciousness, but also because this shift in attitude reaches far too deep into our habits and modes of behavior for it to be able to be reversed by making a corresponding cognitive correction” (25).
Well, if reification is neither immoral (as Lukács points out) nor simply a factual inaccuracy (as Honneth insists), why is it so bad?
Although grounded in Georg Lukács’s “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” (1923), Honneth’s critique ranges from reification’s economic roots in Marx’s (1944).
Lenin And Philosophy And Other Essays Monthly Review Press 1971 I Love You Essay
In this review, I will highlight Honneth’s critique of Lukács, on which basis Honneth redefines and defends reification as a category of social criticism.In the opening lines of “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács mimics Marx in defining reification as “a relation between people [that] takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.” That is, reification is the process by which social or subjective qualities are mistakenly perceived as objective or independent objects. Lukács sees reification as the root of a number of social maladies, from the false consciousness of commodity fetishism to reified structures in industry, politics, law, and reporting.In all of these instances, Lukács argues, objectivity has replaced subjectivity as the gold standard.Throughout his work, Lukács is careful to avoid any explicitly moral terminology, and avoids basing his critique on ethical considerations.Rather, Lukács begins by vigorously defending the need toourselves on Marx’s economic analyses and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities …Western civilization plunged headfirst into an ethical darkness.To meet this colossal challenge, the finest minds of the post-war West worked furtively to reclaim fertile land beyond the sterility and superficiality of consumerism: Lacan excavated the Real, Debord constructed Situations, and Ginsberg dropped LSD.In order to rectify these issues and formulate a theory of reification which (1) respects the value of objectivity, (2) contains a normative (if not moral) element, and (3) is not so reliant on economic explanations, Honneth turns his attention to recent advances in developmental psychology and existential philosophy.Honneth goes on to equate the “primacy of recognition” with Heidegger’s concept of Reification, Honneth concludes, is the praxis which ensues from a “forgetfulness of recognition” — when, “in the course of our acts of cognition, we lose our attentiveness to the fact that this cognition owes its existence to an antecedent act of recognition”(59).During these final hours of the second millennium, intellectuals clung to the fervent, if desperate, belief that — through the thickening cloud of decadence, repression, and conformity — we might once again discover a more original and authentic .Needless to say, this generation of politico-cultural passes, rushes, and punts has failed to return a first down.