When supposedly independent state institutions are used to serve the interests of the governing party, this process is called “politicization” of institutions (Pierre 2004:3).The politicization of state institutions takes place not only in recent states with hybrid regimes or defective democracies but also in old democracies with established rule-of-law traditions (Peters, Falk, and Pierre 2004).
When supposedly independent state institutions are used to serve the interests of the governing party, this process is called “politicization” of institutions (Pierre 2004:3).Tags: Mba Dissertations For SaleWriting A Research Proposal TemplateBusiness Plan Template For InvestorsBusiness Plan Cover Letter To BankWriting Term PapersEssay Hari Raya AidilfitriCompanies That Write Business Plans
with an analysis of anti-corruption laws—the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, the Ehtesab Act, 1997, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999—, this article examines the entanglement of accountability procedures with the actual struggle over power, an entanglement so deep that it shapes both the constitution and the evolution of anti-corruption organizations.
The first section of the article discusses the political factors that have played a crucial role in the formation of Pakistan’s anti-corruption organizations.
In the case of Pakistan, several public administration scholars have accused the civil services of favoring those in power (Chaudry 2011, Khurshid 2011).
The classical perspective on bureaucracy—an efficient machine marked by certain impersonal characteristics, one that is able, in Max Weber’s words, to “treat everybody without regard to the person” (Weber, Roth and Wittich 196)—has rarely been witnessed in operation in Pakistan (Wilder 2009)—or perhaps anywhere at all (Collins 2011).
The relation between the practice of democracy and the activity of anti-corruption institutions, however, deserves attention.
Several studies on democracy and democratization argue that democracy cannot impart political stability and establish civilian supremacy over the military unless it coincides with good governance and the rule of law (Kohn 1997, Nicolescu-Waggonner 2016).Comparative political studies portray full democracy as a cure for extremism (Brooks 2009), bad governance (Stockemer 2009) and corruption (Rock 2009).Yet in the case of Pakistan, many authors have considered the army an impediment to rather than a facilitator of the development of democracy (Shah 2014) and a supporter of Islamic extremism (Nasr 2004).As a result, we have no full view of the overall performance of anti-corruption agencies in connection with parties in government.This paper is the first focusing on performance data and trying to explain the overall performance from the political perspective.Indeed, the paper suggests that the same institutions that have aggressively convicted corrupt officials under some governments have entered into plea discussions under others, a fact which highlights that government transitions have serious effects on the conduct of supposedly independent anti-corruption mechanisms.Indeed, Pakistan’s anti-corruption institutions have largely been used by those in power to maintain their grip on the state by weakening their opponents.Second, the paper uses new statistical data to show that the NAB, founded in November 1999, has tended to side with the interests of the parties and people in government.In much of the recent research in security studies, Pakistan has been viewed as a serious threat to the region and the world because of the risk posed by terrorist groups potentially gaining access to the country’s nuclear explosives (Blair 2011, Clarke 2013).Since 2008, although the military has retreated to the barracks, commentators have pointed out that it retains an influential role in the political sphere (Shah and Asif 2015).Yet very few Pakistan scholars, including those having worked on corruption, such as Faisal Khan (2007) or Sumaira Samad (2008), have examined the association between the pursuit of accountability and the use of anti-corruption agencies for political purposes.